Abstract. In this paper we describe our general framework for usage control (UCON) enforcement on GRID systems. It allows both GRID services level enforcement of UCON as well as fine-grained one at the level of local GRID node resources. In addition, next to the classical checks for usage control: checks of conditions, authorizations, and obligations, the framework also includes trust and risk management functionalities. Indeed, we show how trust and risk issues naturally arise when considering usage control in GRID systems and services and how our architecture is flexible enough to accommodate both notions in a pretty uniform way.
Introduction
Usage control (UCON) is a conceptual model, developed by Park and Sandhu (e.g. see [25] ), which is able to embody and encompass most of existing access control models. The main features are attribute mutability that allows a flexible management of policies and continuity of the usage decision process, i.e. the resource access has a duration and the specific authorization factors must continuously hold. This enhanced flexibility w.r.t. the usual access control frameworks, where, for instance, authorizations are checked once before the access, induces several opportunities as well as new challenges.
Usage control seems a particularly suitable model for managing resources in GRID systems. Those systems often consist of federations of resource providers and users, with many long-lived executions and several conditions and factors to be considered during the usage decision process. For instance, it is common to have GRID computations lasting for hours/days. During the access it is possible that conditions that were satisfied when the access to the computational resources was requested, change by demanding a revocation of access to the resource itself.
GRID systems allow for remote execution of code, where the user that submitted the code is often a priori unknown. This feature demands for both coarse grained usage control, managing the access to the GRID services (also taking This work has been partially supported by the EU FP7 project Context-aware Datacentric Information Sharing (CONSEQUENCE).
into account the service workflow), and fine grained control on the interactions of the code with the resources of the GRID node.
Managing resources offered by several providers to several users demands also for mechanisms to represent trust relationships, and monitor their evolutions during the system computations. Indeed, it is possible to apply stricter policies depending on the trust level of certain users as well as to reduce the trust level of users that do not respect security policies as initially declared.
Also risk naturally arises when dealing with access and usage control in GRID services in several dimensions. For instance, a wrong access decision may have a negative impact on the resources of GRID providers as well as a wrong access revocation on GRID users. While the model defines a continuous monitoring of decision factors (authorizations, conditions and obligations), in order to ensure that these factors are satisfied even when the access is in progress, from a practical perspective this control often must be implemented by a sequence of discrete events, by introducing the possibility that the decisions are not precise enough.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows a possible scenario where the notions of usage control, trust and risk naturally arise in a GRID framework. Section 3 illustrates the application of usage control to GRID systems. Section 4 shows how our architecture considers also trust management languages. Section 5 shows potential areas where risk plays a central role and how we embedded it in our framework. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and recalls some related work.
A Possible Scenario
Consider an Italian university (ItUni) which is involved in a huge GRID project. There are several servers which apart of some internal jobs provide their computational resources (i.e., CPU cycles, memory, disk space) for heavy computations of other Italian universities belonging to the same GRID. Sometimes other research organisations, which are also the subjects of the Italian Ministry of Education, ask for access to the resources. Thus, the first challenge for ItUni is to map unknown subjects to the roles defined in its domain using trust chains defining indirect relationships between those subjects and ItUni.
ItUni allows usage of its resources only to the users and computational jobs which can be considered not very risky. This risk can be connected with a number of possible threats, e.g., normal operation of the servers can be stopped; more resources than asked can be consumed; important data stored or processed by internal jobs can be stolen or destroyed, etc. On the other hand, ItUni is paid for allowing other jobs to run on its servers. Moreover, in order to use the GRID resources for its own purpose the organisation has to allow certain amount of jobs to be processed by its servers (and get some amount of points).
There are two ways of checking the riskiness of granting access to a specific subject: use trust/reputation and/or risk analysis. Trust and Reputation management helps ItUni to allow access only to the subjects which do not usually abuse granted privileges according to the past experience of GRID nodes. Risk
